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Several trends in the financial industry over the past 
decade and a half have potentially threatened the 
competitiveness of small banks. Among these devel-
opments are the numerous mergers that increased 
the size and scope of large banks and greater compe-
tition from mutual funds and other nonbank financial 
institutions. In this article, we examine the economic 
performance of small banks during the 1985-2000 
period by focusing on their ability to attract and 
profitably intermediate insured and uninsured 
deposits. 
[note: 1]. Except where otherwise indicated, data in this article are from 
the quarterly Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) for 
the domestic offices of insured domestic commercial banks and 
nondeposit trust companies (hereafter, banks). The data have been 
adjusted to take account of mergers. 
Bank size categories in this article are based on assets at the start of 
each quarter as follows: large banks (those ranked 1 through 100), 
medium (101 through 1,000), and small. At the start of the fourth 
quarter of 2000, large banks were those with assets of at least 
$6.94 billion; medium, $331 million to $6.93 billion; and small, less 
than $331 million. For more on the economic performance of banks 
over the 1985-2000 period, see, for 2000, William F. Bassett and 
Egon Zakrajsek, "Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at U.S. 
Commercial Banks in 2000,'' Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 88 (June 
2001), pp. 367-93 (www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin), and the 
corresponding article in one of the June-September issues of the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin in each of the earlier years. [end of note.] 
We find that the expansion of deposits and assets at 
small banks, when adjusted to account for the effects 
of mergers on measured growth, has consistently 
exceeded the growth at large banks. Moreover, the 
profitability of small banks has risen to high levels 
over the period. These indications of strength among 
small banks as a whole also hold true for subgroups 
within the small bank sector. The key reasons for the 
generally good performance of small banks in recent 
years appear to be their ability to earn relatively high 
rates of return on their loans and an increase in the 
share of their portfolios devoted to loans. 
RECENT TRENDS AFFECTING SMALL BANKS. 
Among the challenges that have confronted small 
banks since the mid-1980s have been a wave of bank 
mergers and acquisitions, the continued rise in non-
bank competition for customers, and a decline in the 
real value of deposit insurance. Mergers reduced the 
number of banks in the United States from more than 
14,000 in 1985 to about 8,300 at the end of 2000 
(chart 1, top panel). Although many mergers since 
the mid-1990s liberalization of banking laws have 
involved reorganizations within existing bank hold-
ing companies, the number of such banking organiza-
tions also has fallen over the 1985-2000 period, from 
about 11,000 to less than 7,000. Mostly as a result of 
mergers, the share of domestic banking assets held by 
the largest 100 banks (hereafter, large banks) rose 
from about 50 percent to more than 70 percent during 
the period (chart 1, bottom panel). The bulk of the 
gain came at the expense of small banks—those not 
among the 1,000 largest; their share of assets fell 
from about 25 percent to just over 10 percent. 
A merger would tend to improve the competitive 
position of the surviving institution by adding to the 
scope of its activities, thus allowing it to offer a larger 
variety of services and products to customers, and by 
increasing the diversity of its assets. All else equal, 
the greater diversification would act to stabilize earn-
ings, thereby reducing the riskiness of the surviving 
bank and increasing its attractiveness to depositors. 
Alternatively, the now-larger bank could exploit the 
greater diversification to maintain the riskiness of the 
institution around pre-merger levels while adjusting 
its portfolio toward higher-yielding assets, thus boost-
ing profitability. 
[note: 2]. Some research has found that banks do exploit greater diversifi-
cation in this way. For more information, see Rebecca S. Demsetz and 
Philip E. Strahan, "Diversification, Size, and Risk at Bank Holding 
Companies,'' Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 29 (August 
1997), pp. 300-13; and Jalal D. Akhavein, Allen N. Berger, and 
David B. Humphrey, "The Effects of Megamergers on Efficiency and 
Prices: Evidence from a Bank Profit Function,'' Review of Industrial 
Organization, vol. 12 (February 1997), pp. 95-139. [end of note.] chart 1. Number of banks, and industry concentration 
by asset size of banks, 1985-2000 
[top panel: number of banks. In 1985 there were about  14.5 thousand. In 1988 about 13 thousand. In 1991about  12 thousand. In 1994 about 10.5 thousand. In 1997  about 9 thousand. In 2000 about 8.5 thousand.] 
[bottom panel: share of assets. In 1985 large banks about  52%, small banks about 25%. In 1988 large banks about  52%, small banks about 20%. In 1991 large banks about  50%, small banks about 19%. In 1994 large banks about  55%, small banks about 15%. In 1997 large banks about  65%, small banks about 12%. In 2000 large banks about  72%, small banks about 10%.] 
NOTE. Here and in subsequent charts, large banks are the largest 100, and 
small banks are those not among the largest 1,000; for details, see text note 1. 
The competitiveness of the largest banks would 
also be improved if depositors believe that the gov-
ernment will treat these banks as ''too big to fail,'' 
and the perceived advantage would be greater still in 
the context of declining real levels of deposit insur-
ance. 
[note: 3]. The nominal value of deposit insurance was last increased in 
1980, and by a substantial amount—from $40,000 to $100,000. By the 
end of 2000, the value of the insurance in 1980 dollars had fallen to 
between $45,000 and $55,000, depending on the price index used, and 
therefore was in real (inflation-adjusted) terms still slightly higher 
than it was just before the 1980 increase. [end of note.] 
However, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration Improvement Act of 1991 substantially cir-
cumscribed the ability of regulators to use too-big-to-
fail by requiring that the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) pursue the resolution method 
that minimizes the cost to its insurance fund. In 
addition, exceptions to the ''least cost'' method are 
allowed only with the approval of at least two-thirds 
of both the Federal Reserve Board and FDIC board of 
directors and the approval of the Secretary of the 
Treasury in consultation with the President. More-
over, bank regulatory agencies maintain that no bank 
is too large for shareholders and holders of the bank's 
nondeposit liabilities to face complete loss, should 
the decline in bank asset values be large enough, and 
for uninsured depositors to be subject to less than 
100 percent reimbursement. 
[note: 4]. See speech by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System at the 37th Annual Conference on 
Bank Structure and Competition of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, May 10, 2001 (www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/speeches/2001). [end of note.] 
Besides the effects of consolidation and a decline 
in the real value of deposit insurance, increasing 
competition from a ''parallel banking system'' may 
have weakened the competitive position of small 
banks since the mid-1980s. 
[note: 5]. See Jane W. D'Arista and Tom Schlesinger, "The Parallel Bank-
ing System,'' in Gary A. Dymski, Gerald Epstein, and Robert Pollin, 
eds., Transforming the U.S. Financial System: Equity and Efficiency 
for the 21st Century (M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 157-99. [end of note.] 
On the liability side of 
the balance sheet, banks compete with stock, bond, 
and money market mutual funds for deposits. 
Although mutual funds compete with banks of all 
sizes, they likely pose a greater competitive chal-
lenge to small banks, which are more dependent on 
deposits than are large banks. Given their high liquid-
ity and their record of preserving the par value of 
their investors' assets, money market mutual funds 
represent a particularly attractive alternative to bank 
deposits. 
[note: 6]. On only a few occasions has the net asset value of a money 
market mutual fund threatened to dip below $1, and in all but one of 
the cases, the funds avoided "breaking the buck'' by receiving assis-
tance from their parent companies. [end of note.] 
About one-third of money fund assets con-
sist of commercial paper issued by finance com-
panies, which, in turn, compete in markets for con-
sumer loans and business equipment financing, 
markets that may be more important for small banks 
than for large banks. 
Nonetheless, consolidation in the banking industry 
may have had some beneficial aspects for small 
banks. For example, some large banks may find that 
they lack the knowledge and experience necessary to 
compete effectively in the local loan markets of the 
smaller banks they have acquired. Similarly, on the 
funding side, bank depositors may react adversely to 
acquisitions of their banks by out-of-area institutions 
and move their deposits to a locally headquartered 
small bank. 
[note: 7]. For more information, see Steven J. Pilloff and Stephen A. 
Rhoades, "Do Large, Diversified Banking Organizations Have Com-
petitive Advantages?'' Review of Industrial Organization, vol. 16 
(May 2000), pp. 287-302. [end of note.] 
Some other recent developments have also favored 
small banks. The scaling back of the savings and loan industry during most of the period probably reduced 
the competitive pressures on small banks. Moreover, 
depositors may not have been particularly concerned 
about the declining real value of deposit insurance in 
recent years given the strong economy, the high 
profitability of banks, and very low bank failure rates. 
Supporting this view are the continued strong growth 
of money market mutual funds, which have no fed-
eral insurance program comparable to that for bank 
deposits, and the rapid growth of uninsured deposits, 
particularly at small banks. 
DIFFERENCES IN THE LIABILITY STRUCTURES 
OF SMALL AND LARGE BANKS. 
Not surprisingly, small banks rely on deposits consid-
erably more than large banks do. In particular, small 
time deposits (those issued in amounts of less than 
$100,000) funded almost 30 percent of loans and 
other assets at small banks in 2000, while at large 
banks the share was about 10 percent (table 1). The 
share of small banks' assets funded with large time 
deposits, 13 percent, also exceeds that at large banks, 
8 percent. 
[note: 8]. Large time deposits are those of at least $100,000. Deposits of 
exactly $100,000 would be fully insured as to principal. [end of note.] 
Other interest-bearing deposits, which 
consist of savings and transactions accounts, also 
were somewhat more important funding vehicles at 
small banks, while non-interest-bearing deposits 
funded comparable shares of small and large banks' 
assets. 
table: 1. Distribution of assets at banks, by source of funds, selected years, 1987-2000 
Percent 
NOTE. Small time and ''other'' interest-bearing deposits were not separately 
included in the Call Report until 1987. For definitions of bank size, see note to 
chart 1. 
Note on Large Time: Accounts of at least $100,000. 
Note on Insurance Status: 
. Uninsured deposits are those in excess of $100,000. For 1987, the sum of 
uninsured and insured components does not equal total deposits because, 
until 1991, uninsured deposits were reported annually instead of quarterly. 
Note on large deposit accounts: All accounts of at least $100,000. 





1992  Large Banks: 2000  Small Banks: 1987 
Small banks: 
1992  Small Banks: 2000 
Total deposits  66.1  67.3  56.3  88.5  87.8  83.4 
Type: 
Large time  13.7  7.0  8.2  11.2  7.9  13.0 
Type: Small time  10.1  13.4  10.0  29.9  31.5  28.5 
Type: Other interest-bearing  22.7  29.2  24.7  33.3  35.7  29.1 
Type: Non-interest-bearing  19.7  17.8  13.4  14.1  12.8  12.9 
Insurance status: 
Insured  39.2  46.3  35.8  78.8  77.9  68.6 
Insurance status: Uninsured  26.5  21.0  20.5  9.8  10.0  14.8 
FHLB advances 
na  na 
2.4 
na  na 
3.1 
Other liabilities  29.2  26.0  33.2  3.2  3.1  3.2 
Equity capital  4.7  6.7  8.1  8.3  9.1  10.3 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
MEMO: 
Large deposit accounts: 
Percentage of balances in large 
time deposits  39.6  29.9  31.1  58.3  45.3  49.0  Memo: 
Large deposit accounts:Average size (thousands of dollars)  522  440  425  204  209  229 
Large banks fund about one-third of their assets 
with ''other'' nondeposit liabilities, whereas at small 
banks the share is just 3 percent. 
[note: 9]. Other liabilities consist of demand notes issued to the U.S. 
Treasury, federal funds purchased and securities sold under repur-
chase agreements, trading liabilities, net due to related institutions 
abroad, subordinated debt or debentures, and bankers acceptances. [end of note.] 
Small banks avail 
themselves somewhat more of FHLB advances, 
although these represent a fairly small share of liabili-
ties at both groups of banks. Equity also funds a 
larger share of assets at small than at large banks, 
10.3 percent and 8 percent respectively. 
Reliance on deposits was little changed between 
1987 and 1992, but both bank groups shifted toward 
nondeposit liabilities and capital as sources of fund-
ing during the 1990s. Between 1992 and 2000, depos-
its as a share of assets fell about 4 percentage points 
at small banks and 11 percentage points at large 
banks. For both bank groups, ''other interest-bearing 
deposits'' was the deposit category that fell most 
sharply in the 1990s; small time deposits (which are 
fully insured) also declined at both bank groups, a 
drop probably reflecting the increased popularity of 
alternative household investment vehicles such as 
mutual funds. However, the share of assets funded by 
large time deposits actually increased at both bank 
groups. At small banks, the type and average size of large 
deposit accounts (those of at least $100,000) are 
notably different from those at large banks (table 1, 
memo). At large banks, only about 30 percent of such 
balances were held as large time deposits in 2000; the 
remaining 70 percent were in transaction and savings 
accounts. At small banks, large balances are split 
about evenly between large time and other deposits. 
The average size of large deposits at large banks in 
2000 was $425,000, and at small banks it was 
$229,000; however, over the 1990s the average size 
has been declining at large banks and rising at small 
banks. 
DIFFERENCES IN THE GROWTH PATTERNS OF 
LARGE AND SMALL BANKS. 
The consolidation in the banking industry over the 
1985-2000 period typically involved the acquisition 
of relatively small banks by much larger banks, a 
development that, of course, boosts the observed 
growth of large banks and diminishes that of small 
banks. Therefore, the differences in the balance-sheet 
growth and profitability between large and small 
banks cannot be consistently tracked unless merger-
adjusted balance sheet and income data are used. 
[note: 10]. We calculate merger-adjusted growth for any bank size group 
by comparing balance sheet values at the end ofthe quarter with those 
at the beginning of the quarter, accounting for amounts acquired or 
lost during the period because of mergers. For example, we calculate 
asset growth at small banks during a quarter by comparing assets at 
the end of the quarter with assets at the beginning of the quarter after 
removing assets acquired during the quarter by merger. Merger-
adjusted annual growth rates are calculated as the product of merger-
adjusted quarterly growth rates. For information on the adjustment 
procedure for income, see the appendix in William B. English and 
William R. Nelson, "Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at U.S. 
Commercial Banks in 1997,'' Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 84 (June 
1998), p. 408. [end of note.] 
Balance sheet data adjusted for mergers show 
that small banks generally grew faster than either 
medium-sized or large banks over the past fifteen 
years (chart 2, top panel). Indeed, in every year, the 
growth of assets has been significantly faster at small 
and medium-sized banks than at large banks. 
[note: 11]. Calculated without adjusting for mergers, the average annual 
growth rate of assets between 1985:Q4 and 2000:Q4 was 0.2 percent 
for small banks and 8.2 percent for large banks. [end of note.] 
Of 
course, banks securitize and sell a significant portion 
of the consumer and real estate loans that they origi-
nate and thereby move them off their balance sheets. 
But data available since 1997 indicate that restoring 
securitized credit card loans to large banks' balance 
sheets would add only about 1 percentage point to 
their annual asset growth in 1998, and less than that 
in 1997 and 1999, not enough to narrow the differ-
ence in growth rates significantly. 
[note: 12]. Adding securitized assets to the balance sheet for purposes of 
comparison presumes that the securitizing bank still would have 
chosen to originate the loans even if the opportunity to securitize was 
not available. [end of note.] 
In 2000, such an 
adjustment would have reduced the measured growth 
of large banks. 
Chart: 2. Growth of assets and deposits, by asset size of banks, 
1985-2000 
[top panel: assets. In 1985 large assets were about 9%, medium assets  about 11%, small assets about 10.5%. In 1987 large assets were about  -2.5%, medium about 3%, small about 5%. In 1989 large assets were  about 6%, medium about 6.5%, small assets about 7%. In 1991 large  assets were about -2.5%, medium about 3%, small about 6%. In 1994  large assets were about 5%, medium about 7.5%, small about 5.5%.  In 1997 large and medium assets were about 7.5%, small about 15%.  In 2000, large assets were about 8%, medium about 12.5%, and small  about 14%.] 
[middle panel: total deposits. In 1985 large total deposits were  about 8%, medium and small about 10%. In 1987, large total deposits  were about -2%, medium about 2%, small about 5%. In 1989, large  total deposits were about 5%, medium about 5.5%, small about 7%. In  1991, large total deposits were about -3%, medium about 2.5%, small  about 6%. In 1994, large total deposits were about -2.5%, medium about  2%, small about 4%. In 1997 large total deposits were about 3%,  medium about 7.5%, small about 14%. In 2000 large total deposits were  about 7.5%, medium about 12.5%, small about 12%. 
[bottom panel: uninsured deposits. In 1992 large uninsured  deposits were about -3%, medium about 2%, small about 16%. In  1994 large uninsured deposits were about -7.5%, medium about -1%,  small about 9%. In 1996, large uninsured deposits were about 20%,  medium about 12.5%, small about 20.5%. In 1997, large uninsured  deposits were about 8%, medium about 15%, small about 22%. In 1999  large uninsured deposits were about 1%, medium about 10%, small  about 18%. In 2000 large and medium uninsured deposits were about  19%, small about 22.5%.] 
NOTE. Here and in subsequent charts, growth rates have been adjusted for 
mergers; for details, see text note 10. Medium-sized banks are those ranked 101 
to 1,000. Uninsured deposits are those in excess of $100,000; before 1991, 
uninsured deposits were reported only annually, which prevents merger adjust-
ment of balances for those years in a manner consistent with quarterly adjust-
ments applied in later years. 
Many more new, or ''de novo,'' banks were formed 
during the 1997-2000 period than during the preced-
ing four-years (moving from about 150 per year to 
about 350 per year on average). Although de novo 
banks tend to grow rapidly, they are generally very 
small when established (less than $50 million in 
assets). Thus, the growth rate of all small banks is not 
significantly affected if de novo banks are excluded 
from the calculation. 
As suggested by the relative rates of asset growth, 
the expansion of total deposits at both small and 
medium-sized banks has also exceeded the growth 
rate at large banks in every year since 1985 (chart 2, 
middle panel). However, the growth of assets tended to exceed that of deposits, as the use of nondeposit 
liabilities grew for all bank size groups. Uninsured 
deposits also grew significantly faster at small banks 
than at large banks (chart 2, bottom panel). Further-
more, the growth rate of uninsured deposits at small 
banks has been high and steadily increasing during 
the second half of the past decade, whereas at larger 
banks the growth of these liabilities shows no trend. 
The fastest growing category of small banks has 
been the smallest among them—those with less than 
$50 million in assets (chart 3, top and middle panels). 
The 1997-2000 rise in the growth of assets and 
deposits at these banks was strong even after adjust-
ing for the formation of de novo banks. The smallest 
of the small banks have aggressively acquired unin-
sured deposits to help fund their expansion (chart 3, 
bottom panel). Although small banks with assets of 
more than $50 million grew more slowly than the 
smallest banks, they still grew faster than large banks. 
Chart 3. Growth of assets and deposits at small banks, 
by asset size of banks, 1985-2000 
[top panel: assets. Three measures: more than $150 million (a),  between $50 million and $150 million (b), and less than $50 million (c).  In 1985 A was about 10.5%, B about 8.5%, C about 12.5%. In 1987  A and B were about 6.5%, C about 10%. In 1990 A and B were about  8%, C about 12%. In 1992 A was about 7%, B about 8%, C about 11%.  In 1993 A was about 7%, B about 7.5%, C about 13%. In 1994 A and B  were about 7%, C about 10%. In 1995 A and B were about 10%, C  about 22%. In 1996, A and B were about 8%, C about 19%. In 1997 A  and B were about 9.5%, C about 43%. In 1998 A and B were about 10%,  C about 31%. In 1999 A and B were about 9%, C about 42%. In 2000  A and B were about 10%, C about 41.5%.] 
[middle panel: total deposits.Three measures: more than $150  million (a), between $50 million and $150 million (b), and less than $50  million (c). In 1985 A was about 9%, B about 8%, C about 13%.  In 1987 A and B were about 2%, C about 9.5%. In 1990 A and B were  about 6%, C about 14%. In 1992 A was about 4%, B about 5%, C about 10%.  In 1993 A was about 2%, B about 3%, C about 13%. In 1994 A and B  were about 2%, C about 6%. In 1995 A and B were about 9%, C  about 20%. In 1996, A and B were about 7%, C about 14%. In 1997 A  and B were about 8%, C about 41%. In 1998 A and B were about 10%,  C about 28%. In 1999 A and B were about 5%, C about 36%. In 2000  A and B were about 9%, C about 27%.] 
[Bottom panel: uninsured deposits.Three measures: more than  $150 million (a), between $50 million and $150 million (b), and less  than $50 million (c).  In 1992 A was about 10%, B about 20%, C about 30%.  In 1993 A was about 10%, B about 18%, C about 58%.  In 1994 A was about 5%, B about 10%, C about 26%.  In 1995 A was about 19%, B about 17%, C about 50%.  In 1996, A and B were about 20%, C about 40%. In 1997 A  was about 18%, B about 20%, C about 62%. In 1998 A and B were  about 20%, C about 46%. In 1999 A was about 12%, and B about 17%,  C about 72%. In 2000 A and B were about 18%, C about 60%.] 
NOTE. For measurement of uninsured deposits, see table 1, note 2. 
Another way to disaggregate small banks is by 
location. Doing so reveals that growth has been the 
fastest among urban banks and the slowest among 
rural banks with high concentrations of agricultural 
loans; the growth of other small banks in rural areas 
falls in between. However, even agricultural banks 
tended to perform at least as well as large banks over 
the period studied (see box ''Rural and Agricultural 
Banks''). 
The growth patterns of large and small banks partly 
reflect changes in their overall balance sheet condi-
tions and fluctuations in the business cycle. Both 
large and small banks were major suppliers of credit 
during the final years of the 1980s, when businesses 
and households were rapidly accumulating debt. By 
the early 1990s, a weak economy as well as high debt 
levels and a rising volume of delinquent loans signifi-
cantly slowed spending and borrowing by businesses 
and households. The slowdown in the growth of bank 
assets and deposits at that time was most pronounced 
at medium-sized and large banks, however, with 
assets actually declining for a time at bigger banks. 
Chart 4. Measures of balance-sheet health, by asset size of banks, 
1985-2000 
[top panel: delinquency rates.  Two measures: small banks and large banks. In 1985, large and small  were about 5.1%. In 1986 large was about 4.8%, small about 5.7%.  In 1987 large was about 6.1%, small about 5%. In 1990 large was  about 6%, small about 4%. In 1991 large was about 7.2%, small about  4.5%. In 1994 large was about 3%, small about 2.6%. in 1997 large  was about 2.2%, small about 2.6%. In 2000 large and small were about  2.2%.] 
[bottom panel: equity as a share of assets.  Two measures: small banks and large banks. In 1985, large was about  7%, small about 8.4%. In 1988 large was about 6.4%, small about 8.3%.  In 1991 large was about 7%, small about 8.6%  In 1994 large was about 9.1%, small about 9.5%. in 1997 large  was about 9.9%, small about 10.4%. In 2000 large was about 9.6%,  and small was about 10.2%.] 
NOTE. The data on delinquencies are for domestic and foreign offices of 
domestic banks. Delinquent loans are loans that are not accruing interest and 
those that are accruing interest but are more than thirty days past due. The 
delinquency rate is the end-of-period level of delinquent loans divided by the 
end-of-period level of outstanding loans. 
The contraction of assets at large banks may be 
attributable to the fact that overall asset quality dete-
riorated in the late 1980s and especially during the 
1990-91 recession (chart 4, top panel). At small banks, the recession precipitated only a slight rise in 
delinquency rates. As loan losses mounted at large 
banks in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they found 
themselves with depleted capital (chart 4, bottom 
panel). Hence, a substantial gap appeared to emerge 
between their actual capital levels and those being 
demanded by markets as well as by regulators acting 
under the 1991 Basel Accord. 
The subsequent economic recovery and brisk 
expansion of the second half of the 1990s caused 
delinquency rates to drop at both bank size groups, 
but much more dramatically so at large banks. A 
somewhat similar picture emerges for capitalization 
measures: Although the ratio of equity to average 
tangible assets (the ''leverage ratio'') at large banks 
remained well below that at small banks throughout 
the 1985-2000 period, the gap narrowed noticeably 
during 1992 and 1993, and the gain was maintained 
over the rest of the decade (chart 4, bottom panel).
13 
[note: 13]. The ratio of equity to assets is shown here because it can be 
computed for the years preceding the implementation of the Basel 
Capital Accord, in 1991. Small banks also have significantly greater 
capital ratios than large banks when measured by risk-weighted assets, 
a characteristic that may, in part, reflect the higher risk inherent in the 
relatively less diversified loan portfolios at small banks and their more 
limited access to markets for managed liabilities. [end of note.] 
The large banks' impressive recovery from the deep 
problems of the early 1990s could be expected to 
have boosted their competitive position, and indeed 
the recovery in loan growth in the latter half of the 
1990s was a bit stronger at large banks; yet during all 
of this period, the growth of assets at small banks 
surpassed that at large banks. 
Chart: 5. Spread of interest rates paid and spread of growth rates of deposits, small banks less large, 1985-2000 
[top left panel: Total interest-bearing deposits.  Comparing interest rates and deposit growth. In 1985 interest rates  were about 13 basis points, deposit growth about 5 percentage points.  In 1989 interest rates were about -40 basis points, deposit growth about  0 percentage points. In 1992 interest rates were about 70 basis points,  deposit growth about 10 percentage points. In 1994 interest rates were  about 60 basis points. In 1997 interest rates were about 60 basis points,  deposit growth about 9 percentage points. In 1999 interest rates were  about 85 basis points, deposit growth about 11 percentage points. In  2000 interest rates were about 70 basis points, deposit growth about  4 percentage points.] 
[top right panel: Small time.  Comparing interest rates and deposit growth. Interest rates starts appearing  in 1987. In 1985 deposit growth was about 7 percentage points. In 1987  interest rates were about 15 basis points, deposit growth about -2  percentage points. In 1989 interest rates were about -60 basis points,  deposit growth about -3 percentage points. In 1991 interest rates were  about 35 basis points, deposit grown about 11 percentage points. In 1992  interest rates were about 65 basis points, deposit growth about 10  percentage points. In 1994 interest rates were about 40 basis points,  deposit growth about 0. In 1997 interest rates were about 25 basis points,  deposit growth about 15 percentage points. In 2000 interest rates were  about 0, deposit growth about 6 percentage points.] 
[bottom left panel: Large time.  Comparing interest rates and deposit growth. In 1985 interest rates  were about -15 basis points, deposit growth about 9 percentage points.  In 1987 interest rages were about-55 basis points, deposit growth about  -5 percentage points. In 1991 interest rates were about 0 basis points,  deposit growth about 14 percentage points. In 1993 interest rates were  about -13 basis points, deposit growth about 27 percentage points. In  1994 interest rates were about 15 basis points, deposit growth about  10 percentage points. In 1996 interest rates were about 25 basis points,  deposit growth about -12 percentage points. In 1998 interest rates were  about 55 basis points, deposit growth about 10 percentage points. In  2000 interest rates were about 25 basis points, deposit growth about 8  percentage points.] 
[bottom right panel, other interest bearing deposits.  Comparing interest rates and deposit growth. Interest rates starts appearing  in 1987. In 1985 deposit growth was about 2 percentage points. In 1987  interest rates were about 35 basis points, deposit rate about 5 percentage  points. In 1989 interest rates were about -45 basis points, deposit growth  about -5 percentage points. In 1992 interest rates were about 55 basis  points, deposit growth about 10 percentage points. In 1993 interest rates  were about 62 basis points, deposit growth about 8 percentage points. In  1995 interest rates were about 20 basis points, deposit growth about 3  percentage points. In 1999 interest rates were about 60 basis points,  deposit growth about 11 percentage points. In 2000 interest rates were  about 50 basis points, deposit growth about -1 percentage points.] 
NOTE. Rates paid on small time deposits and on ''other'' interest-bearing 
deposits were not separately included in the Call Report until 1987. 
THE EXPANSION OF DEPOSITS AT SMALL 
BANKS: RELATIVE OFFERING RATES AND 
RELATIVE DEPOSIT GROWTH. 
The growth of total interest-bearing deposits at small 
banks consistently exceeded that at large banks 
between 1985 and 2000; the difference tended to 
reflect the difference between deposit interest rates 
paid at small banks and the rates paid at large banks 
(chart 5, top left panel). 
[note: 14]. Average interest rates on deposits are computed as quarterly 
interest expenses, annualized, as a percent of average deposits held 
over the quarter. Annual rates are averages of quarterly rates. Both 
average deposit levels and deposit expenses are calculated after adjust-
ment for mergers. [end of note.] 
Early in the period, small 
banks were outbidding large banks for deposits; the reversal of this relationship in the late 1980s and into 
1990 seemed to prompt a relative speedup of growth 
of deposits at large banks. In the 1989-93 period, the 
average rate paid on interest-bearing deposits at small 
banks rose about 1 percentage point relative to rates 
at large banks, thereby about tripling the premium 
paid by small banks in the mid-1980s. In response, 
the growth rate of deposits at small banks rose sub-
stantially compared with that at large banks. 
The spread of deposit rates at small banks over 
those at large banks remained elevated and even 
increased somewhat over the course of the 1990s, but 
the corresponding spread for deposit growth did not 
keep pace. The relationship between rates and deposit 
growth loosened because of large time deposits, for 
which the growth spread tended to diminish even as 
the interest rate spread trended up (chart 5, bottom 
left panel). For small time deposits, by contrast, the 
underlying relationship between relative offering 
rates and deposit growth does not seem to have 
shifted over the period (chart 5, top right panel). In 
the ''other interest-bearing deposits'' category, the 
relationship weakened substantially in 2000, largely 
because of special factors that boosted the growth of 
insured deposits at large banks during the final quar-
ter of last year (chart 5, bottom right panel). 
[note: 15]. On behalf of its clients, a large brokerage house transferred 
funds from (uninsured) money market mutual funds to insured money 
market deposit accounts at its affiliated commercial banks during the 
fourth quarter of 2000. The transfers significantly boosted the growth 
of insured deposits at large banks. [end of note.] 
These patterns of deposit growth and deposit offer-
ing rates at large and small banks raise two questions. 
First, why did small banks choose to pay premium 
rates on their deposits to fund asset growth that was 
faster than at large banks? Second, why did the 
additional deposit growth become progressively 
more expensive? The first question would seem to be 
answered straightforwardly by the fact that small 
banks have been able to make loans that have con-
sistently yielded more than loans at large banks 
(chart 6). 
[note: 16]. The higher gross rate of return at small banks may reflect, in 
part, higher loan processing costs (per loan dollar), although advances 
in technology have no doubt lowered such expenses throughout the 
period studied. [end of note.] 
Chart: 6. Return on loans, by assets size of banks, 1985-2000 
[top panel: rate of return. Comparing large and small banks.  In 1985 large was about 11.4%, small about 12.8%. In 1987 large was  about 9.2%, small about 10.6%. In 1989 large was about 11.6%, small  about 11.9%. In 1994 large was about 7.2%, small about 8.5%.  In 1995 large was about 8.8%, small about 10.2%. In 1999 large was  about 7.8%, small about 9.2%. In 2000 large was about 9%, small  about 9.8%.] 
[bottom panel: spread of returns, small banks less large.  In 1985 about 130 basis points. In 1986 about 190 basis points. In  1989 about 20 basis points. In 1992 about 160 basis points. In 1995  about 80 basis points. In 1996 about 130 basis points. In 2000 about  75 basis points.] 
As to the relative rise in the cost of deposits at 
small banks, a number of factors appear to have been 
in play. First, small banks have a more limited base 
from which to attract funding. Thus, at small banks, 
the marginal supply of funding is likely to be more 
dependent on deposit offering rates than it is at large 
banks because large banks can more easily tap nonde-
posit funding sources and thereby minimize the 
impact on rates in any one category of liabilities. 
Combined with the relatively greater need of small 
banks for deposits to fund stronger loan demand, a 
relatively narrow funding base would help to explain 
the comparative increase over time in the cost of 
deposits to small banks. 
A second likely reason for the rising relative cost 
of attracting deposits at small banks is the improve-
ment in balance sheet health at large banks, which in 
turn presumably lowered the risk premiums they paid 
on their deposits, especially on uninsured deposits. 
Still another factor could have been the sliding real 
value of deposit insurance. This decline would have 
required all banks to rely less on insured deposits, but 
these deposits are more important at small banks than 
at large banks. Moreover, a shrinkage in the real 
value of deposit insurance could have magnified the 
effect of the relative improvement in balance sheet 
health at large banks. The drop in the real level of 
insurance coverage would also have added to the 
advantage that the largest banks enjoy from whatever 
credence depositors may still give to the notion of 
''too big to fail.'' Finally, more attractive deposit substitutes, such as 
mutual funds, were growing briskly throughout the 
1990s. The competition that banks had from mutual 
funds was offset to some degree by problems in the 
thrift industry, where assets declined 26 percent 
between 1989 and 1997. But the fact that more than 
half of the decline had been reversed between 1997 
and 2000 suggests that the thrift industry's competi-
tive pressure on banks had begun to re-emerge in 
those years. 
Box: Rural and Agricultural Banks. 
Growth at small banks over the 1985-2000 period has 
varied somewhat by bank type and location. In particular, 
loans and securities (bank credit) have grown consistently 
more slowly at small agricultural banks than at other small 
rural banks or at the clear growth leaders among small 
banks—the small urban banks (chart, upper left panel). 
[note: 1]. Small banks are classified as ''urban'' if they are headquartered within 
a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Small ''rural'' banks are divided 
into ''agricultural'' banks (those with more than 25 percent of their loans that 
are secured by farmland or used to finance agricultural production) and 
''other rural'' banks. [end of note.] 
Also, credit growth during the 1990s at small urban and 
other rural bank groups has consistently exceeded that at 
large banks, but the record of the small agricultural banks 
has been mixed. 
Performance of banks, by asset size and sector, and growth of nonfinancial business debt, 1985-2000 
[upper left panel: growth of bank credit (bank credit is loans and securities).  Comparing small urban, small other rural, small agricultural, and large.  Small Urban starts at about 15% in 1985, with a low of about 7% in 1989,  a high of about 25% in 1999, and ending at about 22% in 2000.  Small other rural starts at about 7% in 1985 with a low of about 5 in 1989, a  high of about 10% in 1990 and 1999, and ending at about 8.5% in 2000.  Small agricultural starts at about 1% in 1985 which is its lowest point on  this graph. It reaches a high of about 9% in 1990. Ends at about 6% in 2000.  Large starts at about 11.5% in 1985 and is more erratic than the other three.  It hits about 2% in 1987, up to about 8% in 1989, down to a low of about  -3 in 1991, up to about 7.5% in 1995, down to about 1.5% in 1996, a high  of about 10% in 1998, and ending at about 7.5% in 2000.] 
[lower left panel: spread of rates paid on large time deposits, small banks  less large. Comparing small other rural, small urban, and small agricultural.  In 1985, small other rural was about -6 basis points, small urban about -22  basis points, small agricultural about -2 basis points. In 1988 they all hit  lows at about -60 for small other rural, -52 for small urban , -90 for small  agricultural. In 1991 Small other rural was about -10 basis points, small  urban about -2 basis points, small agricultural about -10 basis points. In  1994 small other rural was about 24 basis points, small urban and small  agricultural were about 13 basis points. In 1997 small other rural and small  urban were about 20 basis points, small agricultural about 15 basis points.  In 1998 they were all at about 50 basis points. In 2000 small other rural  was about 20, small urban about 35, and small agricultural about 13.] 
[upper right panel: growth of debt. Comparing nonfinancial and farm.  In 1985, Nonfinancial is about 12%, Farm about -8%. In 1986  nonfinancial is about 12%, farm about -12.5%. . In 1991 nonfinancial  was around -2.5%, farm about 1.5%. In 1992 both are about 0. In  1995 nonfinancial is about 7.5%, farm about 3%. In 1999 nonfinancial  was about 12%, farm about 2%. In 2000 nonfinancial was about 10%,  farm about 2.5%.] 
[lower right panel: return on assets. Comparing small urban, small  other rural, small agricultural, and large. In 1985 small agricultural  was at about .45%, large was about .65%, small urban about .7%,  small other rural about .9%. In Small agricultural and small other  rural hit their lows in 1986 at about .35% and .75% respectively.  Small Urban hit its low in 1987 at about .4%. Large it its low in  1991 at about .25%. In 1994 small urban and large are at about 1.05%,  small agricultural was at about 1.18%, small other rural about 1.25%.  In 1997 large and small other rural were about 1.3%, small agricultural  about 1.25%, and small urban about 1.35%. In 2000 small urban was  about 1.1%, and the other three were about 1.2%.] 
NOTE. For definitions of small-bank sectors, see note to box text. The debt 
of nonfinancial businesses, including the farm subsector, covers bank and 
nonbank lenders. 
SOURCE. For nonfinancial business debt, Federal Reserve flow of funds 
accounts; for farm business debt, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricul-
tural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook, Annual Lender Issue, 
Economic Research Service, AIS-76 (February 2001), p. 56. 
Developments in the agricultural sector itself appear to 
explain much of the underperformance of agricultural banks 
relative to large and other small banks. The slow growth of 
farm business debt relative to all nonfinancial business debt 
over the past several years (chart, upper right panel) sug-
gests that the demand for agricultural loans has lagged 
substantially behind the demand for other bank loans. More-Box: Rural and Agricultural Banks—Continued. 
over, commercial banks' share of farm business debt con-
tinued to increase during the past five years, although at a 
slower rate than in the late 1980s and early 1990s (data not 
shown). The slowing reflects, in part, a pickup in market 
share by the Farm Credit System over the same period as it 
recovered from financial difficulties in the 1980s. 
Although rates of credit growth have diverged among 
small bank sectors, the sectors converged in terms of the 
spread of the average interest rates they paid on large time 
deposits (chart, lower left panel). Small urban banks have 
been paying only slightly greater premiums on these depos-
its than small rural banks despite having much higher 
average growth rates, a difference that presumably reflects 
more robust economic growth in urban areas. 
Yet the increase in interest expense at small agricultural 
banks relative to large banks does not appear to have been 
especially damaging to the profitability of the agricultural 
banks (chart, lower right panel). Measured by return on 
assets, profitability at agricultural banks has generally been 
better than at small urban banks and, until recently, at least 
as good as at large banks. 
In sum, although credit has grown most rapidly at small 
urban banks, and small agricultural banks are not paying 
much less for large time deposits than are other small 
banks, the agricultural banks during the 1985-2000 period 
generally performed at least as well as the largest banks in 
terms of asset growth and measures of profitability. [end of box.] 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFITABILITY. 
The interaction of changes in rates earned on assets 
with rates paid on liabilities is captured in the behav-
ior of banks' net interest margin. 
[note: 17]. Net interest margin is defined as the difference between interest 
income and interest expense divided by average interest earning 
assets. [end of note.] 
During most of 
the 1990s, the relative cost of deposits at small banks 
rose (chart 5), yet their net interest margin held 
steady while the net interest margin for large banks 
drifted down (chart 7, upper left panel). The steady 
returns at small banks suggest that the better yields 
they were able to get on loans made up for the higher 
rates they had to pay for deposits. Small banks also 
expanded the share of their portfolios held as loans 
throughout the 1990s, whereas the share of loans 
in the portfolios of large banks has remained more 
or less stable since 1995 (chart 7, top right panel). 
Because loans typically earn more than securities, 
this change in relative portfolio structure also would 
tend to boost net interest margins at small banks. 
Since 1997, the net interest margin has fallen at both 
small and large banks, but margins are still much 
higher at small banks. 
Turning to broader measures of profitability, the 
return on equity (ROE) at large banks stabilized at an 
average of about 15 percent throughout the latter half 
of the 1990s after fluctuating widely during the late 
1980s and early 1990s (chart 7, bottom left panel). 
Small banks' return on equity was also fairly stable 
during the 1990s and was uniformly above the returns 
earned during the latter half of the 1980s. ROE at 
large banks has been significantly greater than at 
small banks since 1992, but the difference largely 
reflects the greater levels of capital relative to assets 
held by small banks. 
In terms of the return on assets (ROA), small banks 
have generally been more profitable than large banks 
(chart 7, bottom right panel), an achievement that is 
especially impressive given the greater (and growing) 
earnings on off-balance-sheet activities at large 
banks. Indeed, the jump of large banks' ROA over 
that of small banks in 1999 is attributable to large 
gains in revenue from capital markets business and 
trading operations; such revenue is not a significant 
portion of income at small banks. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
Generally, small banks have thrived over the past 
decade and a half despite what might be seen as a 
variety of adverse circumstances, including extensive 
bank consolidation, a solid improvement in the bal-
ance sheet health of large banks, rapid growth in 
mutual funds and other elements of a ''parallel'' 
banking system, and a steady decline in the real value 
of deposit insurance. Despite these circumstances, 
and abstracting from the effects of mergers and acqui-
sitions, small banks have grown considerably more 
rapidly than large banks and have tended to meet 
or exceed them in some measures of profitability. 
Although small banks that are concentrated in agri-
cultural lending have grown more slowly than other 
small banks, overall credit demand in the agricultural 
sector likewise has been relatively subdued. The 
robust growth and high profitability we find at small 
banks apparently have not gone unnoticed by the investors that have formed significant numbers of 
new banks in recent years. 
7. Profitability, by asset size of banks, 1985-2000 
[top left panel: net interest margin. comparing small and  large banks. In 1985 large was about 3.6%, small about  4.7%. In 1990, large was about 3.5%, small about 4.4%.  In 1992 large was about 4.1%, small about 4.7%. In  2000 large was about 3.7%, small about 4.6%.] 
[top right panel: loans as a share of total assets. Comparing  small and large banks. In 1985 small was about 54%, large  about 61%. iIn 1987 small was about 52.5%, large about  62%. In 1989 small was about 57%, large about 66%. In  1994 small was about 54%, large about 58%. In 1997  small was about 60%, large about 63%. In 2000 small was  about 64%, large about 65%.] 
[bottom left panel: return on equity. Comparing small  and large banks. In 1985 small was at about 8%,  large about 12%. In 1987 small was about 7%, large  about -8%. In 1988 small was about 8%, large about 15%.  In 1989 small was about 10%, large about 3%. In 1991  small was about 11%, large about 6%. In 1993, small was  about 12.5%, large about 17%. In 1994 small was about  12% large about 15%. In 2000 small was about 12%, large  about 14%.] 
[bottom right panel: return on assets. Comparing small  and large banks. In 1985 large was about .6%, small about  .7%. In 1987 large was about -.4%, small about .6%. In  1988 large was about .75%, small about .7%. In 1989  large was about .2%, small about .8%. In 1991 large was  about .35%, small about .95%. In 1993 large and small  were about 1.2%. In 1999 large was about 1.3%, small  about 1.15%. In 2000 large and small were about 1.15%.] 
NOTE. Net interest margin and the returns on equity and assets are for 
domestic and foreign offices of domestic banks; loan share is for domestic 
offices only. 
As small banks have increased their deposit rates 
relative to those at large banks, they have generally 
enjoyed a relative increase in deposit growth. How-
ever, in the large time deposit category—where the 
majority of funds are uninsured—the ability of small 
banks to increase the flow of deposits by pushing up 
interest rates has diminished somewhat over time. A 
significant factor in the diminishment was the more 
rapid growth of balance sheets at small banks com-
bined with their relatively more limited funding 
options. Also contributing was the return to health of 
the large bank sector and, more recently, of the thrift 
sector. The decline in the real value of deposit insur-
ance presumably also played a role but one that 
would have been limited after the early 1990s by 
sharp declines in the rate of bank failures. 